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Thank you. 
D.Bruce Oliver #5120 
Attorney for Defendants and Appellants 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490 
Telephone: (801) 328-8888 
Fax: (801) 595-0300 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
oooOooo 
STATE OF UTAH, ( RESPONSE TO PETITION 
) FOR REHEARING 
Plaintiff and Appellee, ( 
vs. ( Case No. 960271-CA 
BRADLEY C. DAVIS and ( 
HOLLY H. HYATT, ) Priority No. 2 
Defendants and Appellants. ) 
Appellant Davis was on probation for a misdemeanor theft in Kane 
County; Appellant Hyatt was not on probation, nor had she been suspect of illegal 
conduct. Because an officer, one night, witnesses Appellant Davis run into a man at a 
truck stop, who the day earlier was arrested for possession of a drug paraphernalia, the 
appellant's probation officer and other agents conducted a search of the couples' home 
and vehicles. The agents lacked a reasonable facts to suspect mat the appellants' were 
committing a public offense. Nonetheless, the agents do find small amounts of drugs 
and the appellants were subsequently charged with possession with intent to distribute. 
POINT I. 
THE APPELLATE COURTS ARE FREE TO RULE ON QUESTIONS OF LAW ON 
DE NOVO. 
In this matter, the appellant claims a violation of due process. The State 
believes, mistakenly so, that it was deprived of the opportunity to respond to the issue 
of "common authority or control." The State failed to adequately address the issue of 
the Davis' control over Hyatt's vehicle. The appellants adequately addressed the issue 
absent controlling Utah jurisprudence on the issue to brief more clearly than as 
presented by the appellants. Nonetheless, this Court's majority opinion was correct 
when it determined that the appellants had adequately raised and preserved the issue, 
Just as the Court pointed out, the appellants argued the matter in the trial court, 
addressed it in their brief, and argued it again at oral arguments. 
The fact that this Court included persuasive authority from other 
jurisdictions, when the appellants had not was not an abusive of discretion on questions 
of law. These issues were and are reviewable de novo and no particular deference is 
accorded to the trial court. The Utah Supreme Court stated: 
When it comes to reviewing trial court determinations of law, however, the 
standard of review is not phrased as "clearly erroneous." Rather, appellate 
review of a trial court's determination of the law is usually characterized by the 
term "correctness," Controlling Utah case law teaches that "correctness" 
means the appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in 
any degree to the trial judge's determination of law. State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 
431, 433 (Utah 1993); see, Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 
1381, 1383 (Utah 19.93). This is because appellate courts have traditionally been 
seen as having the power and duty to say what the law is and to ensure that it is 
uniform throughout the jurisdiction. Charles Alan Wright, The Doubtful 
2 
Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 Minn. L. Rev. 751, 779 (1957); see, 
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1266. In other words, one can visualize the traditional 
standard-of-review scheme as a continuum of deference anchored at either end 
by die clearly erroneous and correction-of-error standards, which correspond 
with whether the issue is characterized as one of fact or of law. 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (1994). (Emphasis added). The Court is not limited in its 
review of the issue presented in this matter. It is within the discretion of the Court to 
address and review the facts of the case in light of existing case law, both precedent 
and persuasive authority to develop Utah jurisprudence as the appellate court's deem 
necessary and appropriate. 
As the Utah State Supreme Court has stated: 
In Utah, the supreme court has, in addition to common law power, 
constitutional authority to manage the appellate process, Utah Const, art. 
V, § 1, art. VIII, §§ 1, 4, as well as inherent supervisory authority over 
all courts of this State. Ejx., State v. Brown, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 7 
(Nov. 30, 1992); State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 290 (Utah 1989) 
(Zimmerman, J., concurring), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990); State 
v. Florez, 777 P.2d 452, 458 (Utah 1989); State v. James, 767 P,2d 549, 
557 (Utah 1989); In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 653 (Utah 
1988); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 499 (Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring in the result); In re Clatterbuck, 700 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 
1985). Unless constrained by a constitutional or statutory provision, we 
exercise our powers to fashion standards of review that we think best 
allocate responsibility between appellate and trial courts in light of the 
particular determination under review. Based on the foregoing, we 
conclude that the allocation of responsibility, or discretion, between trial 
and appellate courts is a matter of peculiar and close importance to the 
courts in question, and we see no reason why our authority to define 
standards of review should not extend to cases where the determination 
under review is a question of federal law. 
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993). The Thurman Court went on to 
3 
explain, in pertinent part: 
It is widely agreed that the primary function of a standard of review is to 
apportion power and, consequently, responsibility between trial and 
appellate courts for determining an issue or class of issues. See, e.g., 
State v. Sykes, 198 Utah Adv. Rep. 35, 38 (Ct. App. Oct. 19, 1992) 
(Jackson, J,, concurring); Davis v. United States, 564 A.2d 31, 36 (D.C 
1989); Paul D. Carrington et aL, Justice on Appeal 130 (1976); Patrick 
W. Brennan, Standards of Appellate Review, 33 Def. L.J. 377, 377 
(1984); Ronald R. Hofer, Standards of Review - Looking Beyond the 
Labels, 74 Marq. L. Rev. 231, 232 (1991) [hereinafter Hofer]; Henry P. 
Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 229, 234-35 
(1985) [hereinafter Monaghan]. Put another way, a standard of review 
allocates discretion between trial and appellate courts. In determining the 
appropriateness of a particular allocation of responsibility for deciding an 
issue or class of issues, account should be taken of the relative capabilities 
of each level of the court system to take evidence and make findings of 
fact in the face of conflicting evidence, on the one hand, and to set 
binding jurisdiction-wide policy, on the other. See, e ^ , Miller v. 
Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1985); United States v. Ortiz, 878 F.2d 
125, 126-27 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Daughtrey, 874 F.2d213, 
217-18 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 
1201-02 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984); Davis, 
564 A.2d at 36-37, In short, the choice of the appropriate standard of 
review "turns on a determination that, as a matter of the sound 
administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than 
another to decide the issue in question." Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 
552, 559-60 (1988) (quoting Miller, 474 U.S. at 114); accord Salve 
Regina College v. Russell, 111 S. Ct. 1217, 1222 (1991). See generally 
Hofer at 237-41. 
Id. In other words, the Utah Supreme Court absent an expressed Federal Law limiting 
the appellate courts' power are free to govern themselves and rule of Utah matters free 
and clear of out-of-state influences. In this matter, this Court acted clearly within this 
discretion. 
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As for the State's argument, the State relies on the 1992 holding of State 
v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992). In Brown, the Utah Supreme Court refused to 
reach a state constitutional issue that Brown raised for the first time in his reply brief, 
holding: 
If we were to review Brown's state constitutional analysis under those 
circumstances, he would be rewarded for his omission and given the opportunity 
to present an unopposed analysis. The State would be placed in the difficult 
position in future cases of either missing the opportunity to brief the state 
constitutional law issue or having to construct and then rebut the unbriefed issue. 
Id. However, what the State fails to explain is that the facts in Brown are 
distinguishable from the facts in this case. The Brown Court noted in footnote 1: 
In his opening brief, Brown stated that seizure of his clothes and folding knife 
"should have been suppressed under either the state or federal constitutions." 
The State correctly noted that Brown's analysis of the search and seizure issue 
proceeded under Fourth Amendment law with no effort to analyze the question 
under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. The State responded, 
therefore, by discussing only federal law. The State cites State v. Lafferty, 749 
P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988), affd, 776 P.2d 631 (Utah 1989), vacated on 
other grounds sub nom, Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F,2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991), 
where we stated the general rule that "we will not engage in a state constitutional 
analysis unless an argument for different analyses under the state and federal 
constitutions is briefed." 
In his response brief, Brown obviously realized his failure to include a state 
constitutional analysis and asserted this entirely new argument. If we were to 
review Brown's state constitutional analysis under those circumstances, he would 
be rewarded for his omission and given the opportunity to present an unopposed 
analysis. The State would be placed in the difficult position in future cases of 
either missing the opportunity to brief the state constitutional law issue or having 
to construct and then rebut the unbriefed issue. We prefer to review state 
constitutional law issues that both parties have had an opportunity to brief. 
Brown was aware that a state constitutional law claim might be useful to him 
5 
when filing his opening brief. Because he did not analyze that issue at that time, 
we will not review it. 
Id. Unlike the circumstance in Brown, the appellants in this matter have not attempted 
to rehabilitate an appeal where they have realized that they failed to include any such 
state constitutional analysis. However, as pointed out by the Utah Supreme Court, this 
is not an absolute, rather it is a discretionary power. The Court in Romrell v. Zions 
First National Bank, 611 P.2d 392 (1980) previously ruled on this issue stating: 
For the first time, defendants raise the issue of the trial court's failure to make 
findings of fact and conclusions of law in their reply brief. As a general rule, an 
issue raised initially in a reply brief will not be considered on appeal since a 
reply brief, as stated in Rule 75(p)(2)i "shall be limited to answering any new 
matter set forth in respondent's brief . . . ." Nevertheless, the Court, in its 
discretion, may decide a case upon any points that its proper disposition may 
require, even if first raised in a reply brief, 
Id. (Citations omitted, emphasis added). Clearly it is within this Court's discretion to 
consider any fact and research any persuasive authority from other jurisdictions to 
assist it in developing Utah jurisprudence as it has done so in this appeal. 
Reconsidering the appeal or allowing the State to additionally brief the issue of 
"common authority or control" is not likely to result in a change in the outcome of this 
Court's decision of August 6, 1998. 
1
 Now Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
6 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the appellants request this Honorable Court to 
find no merit in the appellee's Petition for Rehearing. The probation officers lacked 
probable cause to search Ms. Hyatt's property. Therefore, its prior decision should be 
upheld. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of 
October, 1998. 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Defendants and Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, D. Bruce Oliver, hereby certify that on this 19th day of October, 
1998,1 served a copy of the foregoing RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR 
REHEARING upon the counsel for the appellee in this matter, by mailing it to him by 
first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following address: Thomas B. 
Brunker, Office of the Attorney General, Heber Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 
6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854. 
Dated this 19th day of October, 1998. 
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Case No. 960271 CA 
Priori h N<> 
POINT I. 
THE APPELLATE COURTS ARE FREE TO RULE ON QUESTIONS OF LAW ON 
BE NOVO. 
In this matter, the appellant claims a violation of due process. The State 
believes, mistakenly so, that it was deprived of the opportunity to respond to the issue 
of "common authority or control." The State failed to adequately address the issue of 
the Davis' control over Hyatt's vehicle. The appellants adequately addressed the issue 
absent controlling Utah jurisprudence on the issue to brief more clearly than as 
presented by the appellants. Nonetheless, this Court's majority opinion was correct 
when it determined that the appellants had adequately raised and preserved the issue. 
Just as the Court pointed out, the appellants argued the matter in the trial court, 
addressed it in their brief, and argued it again at oral arguments. 
The fact that this Court included persuasive authority from other 
jurisdictions, when the appellants had not was not an abusive of discretion on questions 
of law. These issues were and are reviewable de novo and no particular deference is 
accorded to the trial court. The Utah Supreme Court stated: 
When it comes to reviewing trial court determinations of law, however, the 
standard of review is not phrased as "clearly erroneous." Rather, appellate 
review of a trial court's determination of the law is usually characterized by the 
term "correctness." Controlling Utah case law teaches that "correctness" 
means the appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in 
any degree to the trial judge's determination of law. State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 
431, 433 (Utah 1993); see, Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 
1381, 1383 (Utah 1993). This is because appellate courts have traditionally been 
seen as having the power and duty to say what the law is and to ensure that it is 
uniform throughout the jurisdiction. Charles Alan Wright, The Doubtful 
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Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 Minn. L. Rev, - '"M, 779 (11)57J; see, 
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1266. In other words, one can visualize the traditional 
standard-of-review scheme as a continuum of deferent e anciiored at either end 
by the clearly erroneous and correction-of-error standards, which correspond 
with whether the v^u • • characterized as one of fact T M iaw. 
State v. Pena, 869 i ... . . • (hmpluhr ;iill 
n:\ k/<» ii iin; issue piesenled in this nuiiter. It is within the discretion of the Court to 
address and review the facts of the case in light of existing case law, both, precedent 
and persuasive authority to develop Utah jurisprudence as the appellau ~> 
necessary and appropriate. 
'he Utah State Supreme Court has stated: 
In Utah, the supreme court has, in addition to common law power. 
constitutional authority to manage the appellate process, Utah Const, art. 
V, § 1, art. VIII, §§ 1,4, as well as inherent supervisory authority over 
all courts of this State. E j ^ , State v. Brown, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 7 
(Nov. 30, 1992); State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 290 (Utah 1989) 
(Zimmerman, J., concurring), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990); State ' 
v. Florez, 777 P.2d 452, 458 (Utah 1989); State v. James, 767 P.2d 549, 
557 (Utah 1989); In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P,2d 633, 653 (Utah 
1988); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 499 (Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring in the result); In re Clatterbuck, 700 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 
1985). Unless constrained by a constitutional or statutory provision, we 
exercise our powers to fashion standards of review that we think b >; 
allocate responsibility between appellate and trial courts in Sigh- of die 
particular determination under review. Based on the foregoing, we 
conclude that the allocation of responsibility, or discretion, between trial 
and appellate courts is a matter of peculiar and close importance to the 
courts in question, and we see no reason why our authority to define 
standards of review should not extend to cases where the determination 
•. under review is a question of federal law. 
State _  Fhurman, 846 l\2u 1256 (Utah 1993). The Thurman Court went on to 
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explain, in pertinent part: 
It is widely agreed that the primary function of a standard of review is to 
apportion power and, consequently, responsibility between trial and 
appellate courts for determining an issue or class of issues. See, e.g., 
State v. Sykes, 198 Utah Adv. Rep. 35, 38 (Ct. App. Oct. 19, 1992) 
(Jackson, J., concurring); Davis v. United States, 564 A.2d 31, 36 (D.C. 
1989); Paul D. Carrington et al., Justice on Appeal 130 (1976); Patrick 
W. Brennau, Standards of Appellate Review, 33 Def. L.J. 377, 377 
(1984); Ronald R. Hofer, Standards of Review - Looking Beyond the 
Labels, 74 Marq. L. Rev. 231, 232 (1991) [hereinafter Hofer]; Henry P. 
Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 229, 234-35 
(1985) [hereinafter Monaghan]. Put another way, a standard of review 
allocates discretion between trial and appellate courts. In determining the 
appropriateness of a particular allocation of responsibility for deciding an 
issue or class of issues, account should be taken of the relative capabilities 
of each level of the court system to take evidence and make findings of 
fact in the face of conflicting evidence, on the one hand, and to set 
binding jurisdiction-wide policy, on the other. See, e.g., Miller v. 
Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1985); United States v. Ortiz, 878 F.2d 
125, 126-27 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Daughtrey, 874 F.2d 213, 
217-18 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 
1201-02 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984); Davis, 
564 A.2d at 36-37. In short, the choice of the appropriate standard of 
review "turns on a determination that, as a matter of the sound 
administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than 
another to decide the issue in question." Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 
552, 559-60 (1988) (quoting Miller, 474 U.S. at 114); accord Salve 
Regina College v. Russell, 111 S. Ct. 1217, 1222 (1991). See generally 
Hofer at 237-41. 
Id. In other words, the Utah Supreme Court absent an expressed Federal Law limiting 
the appellate courts' power are free to govern themselves and rule of Utah matters free 
and clear of out-of-state influences. In this matter, this Court acted clearly within this 
discretion. 
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As for liic Mat1, s arguiiinil fln; Slate " -'v I992 holdine of State 
* un'v* -c • !> " y ' : '* idii i9b^ ; In Brown, the i iah Supreme Court refuseu to 
reach a state constitutional issue that Brown raised for the lirM umc VA his ^ r . . 
holding: 
If
 w e w e r e t 0 review Brown's state constitutional analysis under those 
circumstances, he would be rewarded for his omission and given the opportunity 
to present an unopposed analysis. The State would be placed in the difficult 
position in future cases of either missing the opportunity to brief the state 
constitutional law issue or having to construct and then rebut the unbriefed issue 
Id However, what tne ; r*. rvt Brow: aiv. 
; i NP **• t% s in tiiis case. Ilie Brown Coun noted in footnote 1: 
In his opening brief, Brown stated that seizure of his clothes and folding MUIC 
"should have been suppressed under either the state or federal constitutions." 
The State correctly noted that Brown's analysis of the search and seizure issue 
proceeded under Fourth Amendment law with no effort to analyze the question 
under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. The State responded, 
therefore, by discussing only federal law. The State .ites State v. Lafferty, 749 
P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988), alTd, 776 P 2d o !^ t Utah 1989), vacated on 
other grounds sub nom. Lafferty v. Cook, 949 K2d 1546 HOth Cir. 1991), 
where we stated the general rule that "we will not engage in a state constitutional 
analysis unless an argument for different analyses under the state and federal 
constitutions is briefed." 
In his response brief, Brown obviously realized his failure to include a state 
constitutional analysis and asserted this entirely new argument. If we were to 
review Browil's state constitutional analysis under those circumstances, he would 
be rewarded for his omission and given the opportunity to present an unopposed 
analysis. The State would be placed in the difficult position in future cases of 
either missing the opportunity to brief the state constitutional law issue or having 
to construct and then rebut the unbriefed issue. We prefer to review state 
constitutional law issues that both parties have had an opportunity to brief. 
Brown was aware that a state constitutional law claim might be useful to him 
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when filing his opening brief. Because he did not analyze that issue at that time, 
we will not review it. 
Id. Unlike the circumstance in Brown, the appellants in this matter have not attempted 
to rehabilitate an appeal where they have realized that they failed to include any such 
state constitutional analysis. However, as pointed out by the Utah Supreme Court, this 
is not an absolute, rather it is a discretionary power. The Court in Romrell v. Zions 
First National Bank, 611 P.2d 392 (1980) previously ruled on this issue stating: 
For the first time, defendants raise the issue of the trial court's failure to make 
findings of fact and conclusions of law in their reply brief. As a general rule, an 
issue raised initially in a reply brief will not be considered on appeal since a 
reply brief, as stated in Rule 75(p)(2)! "shall be limited to answering any new 
matter set forth in respondent's brief . . . ." Nevertheless, the Court, in its 
discretion, may decide a case upon any points that its proper disposition may 
require, even if first raised in a reply brief. 
Id. (Citations omitted, emphasis added). Clearly it is within this Court's discretion to 
consider any fact and research any persuasive authority from other jurisdictions to 
assist it in developing Utah jurisprudence as it has done so in this appeal. 
Reconsidering the appeal or allowing the State to additionally brief the issue of 
"common authority or control" is not likely to result in a change in the outcome of this 
Court's decision of August 6, 1998. 
1
 Now Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
6 
tU<\L'LL$iON 
Based upon (lie I'uregoing. 'Me mpellaiits request this Honorable Court to 
find no merit in the appellee's Petition for Re ' m i probation officers lacked 
probable cause to search. Ms. Hyatt's prpp^tv ^ = _v.^ .u- • 
upheld. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of 
October, 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Defendants and Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, 11 unite uiivcr, Jicichy ccrlii> lli.u in ynii U'\ i>i October, 
] '"J\ ! «I.I >!•', n| in, foregoing RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR 
REHEARING upon the counsel for the appellee in this mutter, by mailing it to him by 
first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the n mowing address: Thomas B. 
Brunker, Office of tin Auonicy uencr.il, Heher WVIK [<iiililmi.» hm Fast 300 South, 
- ' - u Lake Cic\, Utah 84114-0854. 
Dated this 19th day of October, 1998. 
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